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Abstract
In the Web 2.0, more and more personal data are released by users
(queries, social networks, geo-located data,. . . ), which create a huge pool
of useful information to leverage in the context of search or recommen-
dation for instance. In fully decentralized systems, tapping on the power
of this information usually involves a clustering process that relies on an
exchange of personal data (such as user proles) to compute the similarity
between users. In this internship, we address the problem of computing
similarity between users while preserving their privacy and without relying
on a central entity, with regards to a passive adversary.
This research is supported by the Gossple ERC Starting Grant number 204742.




1.1 System model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Adversary model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Privacy, anonymity, and unlinkability . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.3 Privacy in secure multiparty computation . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.4 Privacy in the setting of dierential privacy . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Secure two-party and multi-party computation . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1 Homomorphic encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 Secret sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Dierential privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2 Similarity metrics and secure implementation 14
2.1 Similarity measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 The intersection step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 Scalar product approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.2 Set intersection approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Threshold cosine similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Integer comparison step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Private similarity computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Dierential privacy and utility analysis 21
3.1 Dierentially private threshold similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2 Parametrized sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3 Dierentially private similarity computation . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3.1 Using a semi-trusted third party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3.2 Distributed noise generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3.3 Dealing with real noise as integers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4 Utility analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.1 Statistical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4.2 The utility function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4.3 Selecting the threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4.4 The impact of adaptive noise on utility . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4.5 Alternative utility measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4 Conclusion and future work 33
2
Introduction
Context. Our work addresses privacy concerns in similarity computation in
a fully decentralized distributed system in the context of the Gossple project
[1]. In this section we introduce the Gossple project and gossiping networks
as well as the privacy concerns associated with similarity computations in such
networks.
Gossple. Gossple [2] is a social network, that depends on automatically
grouping acquaintances who share similar interests. The main interest of this
step is to make use of the relevant search experience of similar acquaintances
to help other people in nding more personalized and relevant search results.
Gossple is implemented as a fully decentralized distributed system. Decentral-
ization brings two advantages, the rst one is scalability, basically by using the
collective resources of the entire network. The second advantage is to prevent
the \big-brother" syndrome; as each user controls her own information and there
is no central entity in control of the information about everyone. The main idea
behind Gossple is automatically harvest the network for similar users. Then, by
exchanging information with those users, a personalized query response will be
more viable.
As Gossple is a social network (or is designed to be an extension of a pre-
existing one), it assumes that users have proles. Those proles are usually a
list of items the user have showed an interest in. For instance, in the case of
Delicious1, an item corresponds to a specic Web page and/or the set of tags
used to tag the Web page collection.
Gossple is designed as a gossiping network, which is a special form of dis-
tributed systems where there is no centralized coordinator, and where the net-
work has no specic structure [3]. Since a gossiping network is a form of peer-
to-peer (P2P) systems, we are going to adopt the name \peer" instead of \user"
for the rest of this document. In a gossiping network, peers keep meeting new
peers drawn randomly from the network [4]. In Gossple, at each exchange peers
measure their similarity to decide whether (or not) to become acquaintances.
In this internship we have mainly concentrated on computing similarity be-
tween peers. Moreover, we are focusing on what information about peers' pri-
vate data can leak through this process and how to address this problem. More
precisely, we address two dierent and orthogonal denitions of privacy.
Privacy. Gossple has already developed some protocols to achieve gossiping-
based similarity matching between peers. Experiments have shown that they are
converging and provide reasonable correctness [2]. One withstanding concern
however was about the privacy of the peers' data exchanged in order to perform
the matching. The protocol requires the users to exchange their proles, which
might be considered by some users as private information.
What exactly does \Privacy" mean ? There is two common denitions in
the literature. We rst dene the context in which the privacy is dened: there
is the private input data, there is a function to be computed on these data, and
there is the public output of the function which is intended to be released at the
end of the computation.
1http://www.delicious.com.
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In the traditional cryptographic denition [5], privacy means that anything
that cannot be computed from the public output regarding the private input
of one of the participants, should stay so after the output is released. This is
equivalent to say that anything that can be deduced from the public output is
not considered a privacy leak. The cryptographic model focuses on insuring that
the steps in computing the function itself are secure, i.e. that the private input
is not leaked during the computation. Whatever happens after the computation
ends and the result is released is not a concern there.
On the other hand, the dierential privacy setting [6] assumes that the func-
tion itself is already securely computed by a trusted curator. Dierential privacy
then focuses on what happens after that: what does the function output itself
reveal about the private input, and how to protect this input. Protecting the
input (or preserving its privacy) in this context means that whatever the at-
tacker (who receives the output) knows about a single item in the prole after
receiving the output, should not dier too much (up to a privacy parameter)
whether or not the input did actually contain that item or not (hence the name
\dierential"). Of course, the dierential privacy makes sense only when the
input constitutes of several items and we want to protect the privacy of indi-
vidual items while allowing capturing global properties (such as sum, average,
or similarity). In particular, this applies in the case of protecting the privacy of
proles, because a prole contains several interests, and we want to protect the
privacy of individual interests.
As we can see, the two approaches are complementary, and we shall address
them in Section 2 and Section 3, respectively. Before that, we provide the
necessary background on these notions in Section 1.2.
Internship contribution. In this internship, we propose a protocol based
on cryptographic tools that computes the similarity between two user proles
in such a way that each user only learns the output of the similarity computa-
tion but not the proles themselves. The novelty of our approach is twofold.
Firstly, we introduce a secure protocol for threshold similarity. This protocol
outputs only one bit of information stating whether or not two users are similar
beyond a predetermined threshold. Compared to the exact similarity compu-
tation from which more information can be extracted, this protocol is more
\privacy-preserving" as it reveals less information. Second, we go beyond the
traditional cryptographic framework by analyzing the similarity computation
within the context of dierential privacy.
We have submitted a paper with the contribution of this internship to the Dis-
tributed Computing conference (DISC 2010) entitled \Private similarity compu-
tation in distributed systems: from cryptography to dierential privacy".
Technical challenges. We address the following technical challenges. Con-
sidering a well-known similarity metric, namely cosine similarity [7], we propose
a two-party threshold similarity protocol for this metric and prove its correct-
ness and security (for all the variants we propose) against a passive adversary.
While we focus on the cosine similarity for illustration purpose, our method is
generic enough to be applied to other metrics such as Jaccard index [8].
Afterwards, we design a dierentially-private protocol for the exact similarity
and threshold similarity and analyze its impact with respect to utility. To the
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best of our knowledge, this is the rst attempt to address dierential privacy in
the context of distributed similarity computation. More specically, we rst
analyze the sensitivity of the similarity metric in the context of a protocol
computing exactly the similarity between two proles. We then show that the
(Laplacian) noise required to ensure dierential privacy can be applied before the
application of the threshold function without aecting the dierential privacy
property of the protocol.
We also study the impact of the dierential privacy (which requires the
addition of random noise) on the resulting utility of the similarity measure.
The achievable trade-o between utility (the percentage of threshold decisions
that will be correct 2) and privacy depends on: the value of the threshold, the
size of the item domain, and  (the privacy parameter). We use the utility
also with help of a statistical model to help in choosing the threshold value
for the threshold similarity. We also propose a variant of (global) sensitivity
computation which we call the parametrized sensitivity to enhance the utility
and we prove that it makes the dierential privacy guarantees hold.
We show that in a gossiping-based model to retain the dierential privacy
guarantees, it is necessary to assume the existence of a bidirectionally anony-
mous channel. We also provide a candidate implementation for such channel,
which is called \gossip-on-behalf".
We nally address the distributed nature of the systems by providing three
dierent mechanisms for distributed noise generation. More specically, in two
of them, each peer involved in the two-party computation can generate noise in-
dependently and we then show that by applying these noises we reach dierential
privacy guarantees. In the third mechanism we use a semi -trusted third-party
to add the noise instead.
The report is organized as follows. Firstly, Section 1 provides the required
background and some preliminaries. In Section 2, we introduce the threshold
similarity protocol and prove its security with respect to a passive adversary.
Afterwards in Section 3, we describe dierentially-private protocols for the exact




Notation. Let \a    A" denotes that a is uniform-randomly chosen from
the set A. Let a b A" means that a is chosen from A because a maximizes
a given similarity measure with respect to b. Let the domain of items be I.
The indicator function 1S , (sometimes called the characteristic function of
the set S) is normally a function dened on the the set S such that 1S : S !
f0; 1g. 1S(x) = 1 if x 2 S, and zero otherwise. Assuming the set's domain I is
ordered, we abuse the notation for the rest of this report and we refer to the bit
vector 1S(I) simply as the \indicator function" 1S of the set S. For example
2There is two types of errors, false positive and false negative. Our utility function measures
the probability of not having false negatives. This corresponds to the probability that a
decision which was a negative after applying dierential privacy was also a negative before
applying it.
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Figure 1: Gossple network, adapted from [2]
if the ordered domain I is fcat; dog;mouseg and the set S is fdogg, then the
indicator function 1S = (0; 1; 0) :
A similarity-based gossiping network consists a set of peers N . That set
changes over time due to arrivals and departures. Each peer i 2 N is a tuple
hP;RS;PNi. Where:
 The peer's prole of interests is the set P such that P  I is the peer's
prole of interests.
 RS is a random set of peers, constituting the random sampling layer [4].
RS = facj : j    Ng ;
where acj is a bidirectionally anonymous channel to peer j (Section 1.2.2).
 PN is the personal network of the peer, chosen based on similarity that
the peer uses to pick his social acquaintances.
PN = facj : j i RSg :
Such a model can be seen in Gossple as represented in Figure 1. The gure
is composed of two layers, the rst layer, called RPS (Random Peer Sampling),
corresponds to each peer's RS in our model whereas in the other layer, GNets,
corresponds to the personal network PN . We note that in the second layer
(GNets), peers are gathered in clusters according to their similarity, while in
the lower (random) layer, there is a random graph of peers. In our analysis we
will be focusing mainly on the interaction of two peers at a time.
1.2 Privacy
1.2.1 Adversary model
In this study, we focus only on a computationally-bounded passive adversary
[5], which is assumed to have the ability to access to the memory of some peers
he has corrupted, but does not actively cheat during the protocol. Note that
although we assume the channels between peers are private, the adversary has
access (only) to the channels connected to the peers it has corrupted. This
model is also called the \semi-honest" model because participants are assumed
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to follow the protocol (thus being honest) but record all the information they
have seen during its execution (thus being curious). Other adversary models
exist, like the active adversary (where some participants can be malicious), the
adaptive adversary and the covert adversary. However, we will not consider
these models for our work, and will focus only on the passive adversary model
which is the rst step before providing privacy in stronger models.
1.2.2 Privacy, anonymity, and unlinkability
Anonymity. Anonymity that can be provided is one of three types [9] :
anonymity of the recipient, anonymity of the sender, and unlinkability of sender
and receiver. Note that the latter (which is called relationship anonymity) is
weaker than the rst two [10].
Relationship anonymity can be achieved via a MIX-net [11], assuming that
an adversary does not have full control on all the MIXes. In this scenario,
because even if an adversary wiretapped the similarity value, he cannot use this
information directly unless he knows the sender and the receiver. However he
may learn for a certain receiver its similarity distribution with respect to the
network. This is not an issue because an adversary who is not controlling one of
the peers cannot eavesdrop because the channel between two peers is a private
channel (implemented via cryptographic means).
The problem is when one of the peers is the adversary. We want to avoid the
possibility for a peer (controlled by the adversary) to query the same peer again
and again by impersonating other identities. That can be achieved by preventing
a peer from being able to identify the other peer over a second channel, which
means that the other peer should be anonymous. By symmetry, both of them
should be anonymous to each others, and therefore we need a \bidirectionally
anonymous channel".
The bidirectionally anonymous channel The denition of unlinkability in
[10] states that two items are unlinkable if the probability that they are related
stays the same before (a priori knowledge) and after a execution of the system
(a posteriori knowledge). In our denition, the two items that we require to
be unlinkable are two individuals over two dierent channels. An \execution of
the system", before and after which we measure the a priori and a posteriori
knowledge, refers to the establishment of the channel, but does not take into
account what is exchanged over that channel after it is established. We assume
that attacker might be one of the correspondents (from the \bidirectionality"
requirement) and it follows that it always have access to the channel contents
(even if it is private), therefore if a peer sends his identity over the channel, this
would break the unlinkability but is unavoidable.
Denition 1 (Bidirectionally anonymous channel). Let there be three peers
A;B;B0. Before establishing communication channels to B and B0, A has a
priori knowledge that peers B and B0 might be the same peer with probability
p. The channels are called bidirectionally anonymous if and only if (for all
A;B;B0) after A establishes those channels and before any information is ex-
changed, the a posteriori knowledge of A that B and B0 might be the same peer
is still exactly p, and that the a posteriori knowledge B and B0 (even if they are
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Figure 2: Bidirectionally anonymous channel: The green peer cannot distinguish
situation A from situation B. The same also hold for the blue peer.
the same peer) that the two channels are to the same peer A is exactly the same
as their a priori knowledge.
As in Figure 2, the green peer is unable to distinguish case A from case B.
The same holds for all peers (including the blue peer).
Gossip on behalf One way to implement such a channel is gossip-on-behalf
like Gossple [1]. In gossip-on-behalf (Figure 3), the peer A starts by choosing at
random another peer P in his neighborhood. It then generates a pair of public
key/secret key for this session and asks P to select one of his acquaintances (that
we call B) as the second peer that will be involved in the similarity computation.
The peer P does not disclose the identity of B to A and vice-versa, therefore
acting as an anonymizer. Afterwards, P transmits the public key of A to B
which uses it to encrypt the communication exchanged with A. Finally, B
either also generates a pair public key/secret key for this session or a secret to
be used as the key of the symmetric cryptosystem (such as AES) and transmit
it to A encrypted with his public key via P as a relay. The peers A and B have
now a private bidirectionally anonymous channel between themselves, given the
P is honest and does not collude with either one. The communication between
A and B goes through P but as it is encrypted, this forbids P to learn any
information exchanged during A and B interactions. More complex techniques
based on a chain of proxies or MIX-nets are possible [12, 11, 13, 14].
1.2.3 Privacy in secure multiparty computation
Consider a group of peers, each having their private input, who participated in
computing the value of a predened function of their inputs. They all get the
output of the function at the end. Each peer knows its input and the output
of the function and a log of all the messages he has seen (been a sender of a
receiver of) during the execution of the protocol. An adversary has access to
the information available for a subset of peers he has corrupted.
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Figure 3: Gossip-on-behalf: Peer P makes sure peer A and B does not know
each other identities. Step 1 and 2 is for securing the channel via exchanging
an AES symmetric encryption key. Step 3, a bidirectionally anonymous secure
channel is established via peer P who cannot read the encrypted contents of the
channel.
A protocol is declared private in this model if the adversary cannot deduce
any information about the private inputs of the honest peers (not controlled by
him) other than what can be deduced from the function output and the inputs
accessible to him. In particular, the output itself might carry some private
information, but secure multiparty computation only secures the process of
computing the function and does not take into account what the output itself
might reveal.
For example, the result of a similarity computation between two peers might
give some information to the peer whether a particular item was contained in
the other peer's prole. The most obvious case is where one peer has a set
composed of only one item, yet, this is not considered a privacy leak in the
framework of secure multiparty computation.
1.2.4 Privacy in the setting of dierential privacy
Dierential privacy was essentially designed in the context of statistical database
privacy protection. Its goal is to allow releasing statistics of a database while
preserving privacy of individual rows. In this context, preserving the privacy
of an individual row is equivalent to hiding the fact whether it was in the
database or not from an attacker who has access to the output of the function
and arbitrary background knowledge (including possibly knowledge about every
other row in the database). In our case, the database is two input proles, the
statistic is the similarity value, and the single row is an item in the prole.
1.3 Secure two-party and multi-party computation
The denition of privacy in the model of secure multi-party computation is:
Denition 2 (Privacy with respect to a passive adversary [15]). A multi-party
protocol is said to be private with respect to passive adversary controlling a peer
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(or a collusion of peers), if this adversary cannot learn (except with negligible
probability) more information from the execution of the protocol that he could
from its own input (i.e. the inputs of the peers he controls) and the output of
the protocol.
The privacy is usually modeled as a comparison to an ideal world, where a
trusted third party is available to perform the computation. In that model all
peers send their inputs to the trusted third party, which computes the function
and then return the output to the peers. An adversary in that model gain
information only from its input and the output it receives. Secure multiparty
computation is about producing a secure distributed protocol, that the peers
can execute it without relying on a third party, and without enabling anyone to
learn more than what he would have learned in the ideal model.
General constructions exist [16, 17, 18]. The rst and most general crypto-
graphic one, due to Yao, works by constructing an encrypted bit-wise circuit
where each binary gate has four possible encrypted outputs and the gate's inputs
are the keys to decrypt the correct output [16]. There are other constructions
which requires less communication cost, typically divided into two broad cate-
gories: homomorphic encryption and secret-sharing schemes [19].
1.3.1 Homomorphic encryption
Denition 3 (Additive and ane homomorphic encryption). Consider a public-
key (asymmetric) cryptosystem where (1) Encpk (a) denotes the encryption of
the message a under the public key pk and (2) Decsk (a) = a is the decryption
of this message with the secret key sk3. This cryptosystem is said to additively
homomorphic if there is an ecient operation  on two encrypted messages
such that Dec (Enc (a) Enc (b)) = a+ b. Moreover, such an encryption scheme
is called ane if there is also an ecient scalaring operation  taking as input
a cipher-text and a plain-text and such that Dec (Enc (c) a) = c a.
Paillier's cryptosystem [20] is an instance of a homomorphic encryption
scheme that is both additive and ane. Moreover, Paillier's cryptosystem is
also semantically secure (cf. Denition 4) which means that a computationally-
bounded adversary cannot learn any information about a plain-text m given
its encryption Enc (m) and the public key pk. In this paper, we will also use a
threshold version of the Paillier's cryptosystem [21] (cf. Denition 5).
Denition 4 (Semantic security [15]). An encryption scheme is said seman-
tically secure if a computationally-bounded adversary cannot derive non-trivial
information about the plain text encrypted from the cipher text and the public
key only. For instance, a computationally-bounded adversary who is given two
dierent cipher texts cannot even decide with non-negligible probability if the
two cipher texts correspond to the encryption of the same plain text.
Denition 5 (Threshold cryptosystem). A (t; n) threshold cryptosystem is a
public-cryptosystem where at least t > 1 peers out of n need to actively cooperate
in order to decrypt an encrypted message. In particular, no collusion of even
t   1 peers can decrypt a cipher text. However, any peer may encrypt a value
3In order to simplify the notion, we will drop the indices and write Enc (a) instead of
Encpk (a) and Dec (a) instead of Decsk (a) for the rest of the report.
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Figure 4: Threshold homomorphic cryptosystem: Both peers generate the keys
(step 1), encrypt their numbers (step 2), and perform calculations on the en-
crypted values (step 3 and 4). To decrypt in step 5 they need both their secret
keys.
on its own using the public-key pk. When the threshold cryptosystem is set up,
each peer i gets his own secret key ski (for 1  i  n).
In Figure 4, you can see an example of a threshold homomorphic cryptosys-
tem where peers perform computations on the cipher-text. The To decrypt the
result both peers must cooperate using their secret keys.
1.3.2 Secret sharing
Secret-sharing [19] is a technique that provides perfect secrecy (i.e. provides se-
curity even against unbounded adversaries. cf. Denition 6). Hence also allows
for much less communication cost than other cryptographic techniques. Perfect
secrecy provides information-theoretic security, which means that is when the
security of the system holds even if the attacker possesses unbounded compu-
tational power. More specically, when the system does not depend on the
assumptions of computational hardness of certain mathematical problems, like
factoring or discrete logarithm. In other terms, witnessing the cipher-text and
the public key does not add any information about the encrypted message to
the adversary, regardless of its computational power.
Denition 6 (Perfect secrecy). A cipher-text m is said to be perfectly secure if
any information about m that is learned can also be learned without witnessing
the encrypted message or the key used to encrypt it, and that is given without
any assumptions on the distribution of the potential messages [22, Denition 3].
However, a main problem with secret-sharing technique is that it is not
able to provide multiplication of secrets when there is only two parties. Since
our computation focus on two-party similarity metric, we use homomorphic
encryption instead which can provide multiplication of two cipher-texts in secure
two-party computation (using the multiplication gate [23]).
1.4 Dierential privacy
Originally, dierential privacy [6] was developed in the context of private data
analysis and its main guarantee is that if a dierentially private mechanism is
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applied on a dataset composed of the personal data of individuals, no outputs
would become signicantly more (or less) probable whether or not a participant
removes his data from the dataset. This means that for an adversary which
observes the output of the mechanism, he will only gain a negligible advantage
from the presence (or absence) of a particular individual in the database. This
statement is a statistical property about the behavior of the mechanism (func-
tion) and holds independently of the auxiliary knowledge that the adversary
might have. In particular, it means that even if the adversary knows all the
database except one individual row, a mechanism satisfying dierential privacy
will still protect the privacy of this individual up to a privacy parameter .
The parameter  is public and it may takes dierent value depending of the
application (for instance it could be 0:01, 0:1 or even 0:25).
In alternative terms, dierential privacy aims at protecting the privacy of
individual rows of a database while allowing capturing global properties of the
entire dataset. It has been shown that the process of the computing global
properties must depend on interactive queries [24], and there is no \sanitiza-
tion" techniques (such as k-anonymity, l-diversity and t-closeness [25, 26, 27])
releasing a sanitized version of the database for oine querying, that can pro-
vide absolute privacy and good accuracy for a large number of queries. In the
an interactive model, a trusted third party (curator) interactively reply to the
queries. However, in our context, to preserve the fully decentralized nature of
our systems, no trusted third party should be required. The trusted third party
can be replace by a distributed protocol by using secure multi-party computa-
tion techniques (Section 1.3).
Two inputs S1 and S2 are said to be neighbors if they are both equal except
for at most one entry of the inputs. For instance, if S1 and S2 are proles, it
would mean that they are identical except for one item.
Denition 7 (Dierential privacy [6]). A randomized mechanism A satises
 dierential privacy if for all possible neighboring inputs S1 and S2 , and all
S  Range(A),
Pr[A(S1) 2 S]
Pr[A(S2) 2 S]  exp() ; (1)
where the probability is taken over all the coin tosses of A.
As you can see in Figure 5, the adversary is not able to determine (up to
a privacy parameter ) whether the blue item is in the set or not. That holds
even if the adversary knows every other item in the set and knows f and has
arbitrary background about the blue item.
Dwork, McSherry, Nissim and Smith have designed a general technique,
called Laplacian mechanism [28], that allows to achieve -dierential privacy
for a function f by adding random noise to the true answer before releasing
it. The amount of noise that has to be added is directly proportional to the
sensitivity of the function which measures how much the output of a function
can change with respect to a small change in the input [28].
Denition 8 (Global sensitivity [28]). For f : Dn ! R, the sensitivity of f is
GS (f) = max
S1;S2
kf(S1)  f(S2)k1 ; (2)
for all neighboring S1 and S2.
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Figure 5: Dierential privacy: The green peer cannot decide whether or not the
blue item is in the set given the output of the -dierentially private mechanism
f and having an arbitrary background knowledge.
Parametrized sensitivity, that we refer thereafter simply as sensitivity, re-
quires to x rst the size of the input to the function before computing the
maximum dierence to the output over all neighboring inputs of the corre-
sponding size. In Lemma 1, we show that parametrized sensitivity insures the
dierential privacy condition.
Lemma 1. Parametrized sensitivity insures the dierential privacy condition
as does the global sensitivity.
Proof. The dierential privacy condition [6, Page 4] is that as long as kf(S1)  f(S2)k1 <
GS (f), the ratio exp( ) which is the requirement of the dierential privacy is
the upper bound in Equation (1). The parametrized sensitivity PSparameters (f)
is a tighter bound such that kf(S1)  f(S2)k1  PSjS1j;jS2j (f)  GS (f). Thus
the dierential privacy condition holds.
The Laplace distribution, called Lap (0; ) with mean 0 and scale  is dened





The Laplacian mechanism achieves -dierential privacy by adding noise
directly proportional to GS (f).
Theorem 1 (Laplacian mechanism [28]). For a function f : Dn ! R, a ran-
domized mechanism A achieves -dierential privacy if it releases on input x







for GS (f) the sensitivity of the function f and Lap (0; ) a randomly generated
noise according to the Laplacian distribution with mean zero and scale GS(f) .
The following lemma also shows that dierential privacy is a \natural" notion
that composes well.
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Lemma 2 (Composition and post-processing [29]). If a randomized mecha-
nism A run k algorithms A1,. . . ,Ak where each Ai is -dierentially private,
and outputs a function of the results (i.e A(z) = g(A1(z); : : : ;Ak(z)) for some
probabilistic algorithm g) then A is Pki=1 i-dierentially private.
The lemma also implies that each execution of an -dierentially private
protocol releases at most an amount of privacy proportional to  [28]. Hence,
we want such a protocol to be run no more than once for each two peers.
Unfortunately, this is impossible to prevent since an adversary having access
to more than one peer can gain advantage by executing the protocol through
these peers several times with the same peer. Instead, we use a bidirectionally
anonymous channel (cf. Section 1.2.2) which guarantees that an adversary will
not be able to link two dierent queries over two dierent channels to the same
peer. The only way then to link two executions of the same protocol to the
same peer is through executing both through the same anonymous channel, and
since an honest peer will not agree to engage in the computation two times on
the same anonymous channel, this eectively means that no peer will be able to
get more than the allowed amount of information about an honest peer through
an -dierentially private protocol.
2 Similarity metrics and secure implementation
In this section we formally dene what is similarity measures, and give two ex-
amples of them, namely cosine similarity and Jaccard index. Then we introduce
the concept of threshold similarity. Afterwards, we discuss how to provide a se-
cure implementation for threshold similarity computation that provides privacy
in the secure multi-party computation model.
2.1 Similarity measures
In our context, the main goal of a peer is to detect similar peers (i.e. those with
whom he shares similar interests). Thus, we assume the existence of a similarity
measure that can be used by the two peers to quantify how similar they are.
Similarity between peers depends mainly on their prole of interests, which is
modeled as a set of items that peers has shown interest in (by tagging, liking,
bookmarking, etc.). If the item domain is denoted as I, then a prole p  I.
In the following denition, we denote the same concept as the power set form
p 2 2I.
Denition 9 (Similarity measure). A similarity measure sim is a function tak-
ing as input two sets S1; S2 2 2I representing the proles of two peers and
outputs a value in the range between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates that the sets
are entirely dierent (the proles have no items in common) whereas 1 means
that the sets are identical (and therefore the peers can be considered as sharing
exactly the same interests). Therefore, sim(S1; S2) 2 [0; 1] or more formally:
sim : 2I  2I ! [0; 1] :
Cosine similarity [7] is commonly used to assess the similarity between two
sets (proles) and can be seen as a normalized overlap between the sets. It is
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dened as
jS1 \ S2jpjS1j  jS2j ; (5)
where jS1j ; jS2j are the sizes of the private sets S1; S2 of the rst and second
peer, respectively, and jS1 \ S2j is the size of the set intersection of S1 and S2.
Jaccard index [8] is another common similarity measure which is denes as
jS1 \ S2j
jS1 [ S2j ; (6)
where jS1 [ S2j is the size of the set union between S1 and S2. Other similarity
metrics could also be used, however for the sake of clarity, we focus on the cosine
similarity metric in the rest of this report.
To implement the corresponding similarity measure in our protocol we can
use set intersection protocols or scalar product4 protocols interchangeably; since
the size of the set intersection of two sets is equivalent to the scalar product of
the corresponding indicator functions.
In the rest of this section we discuss the secure implementation of a dis-
tributed protocol to compute the cosine similarity of two peers. In the next
section we explain the rst step of that protocol, which is how to securely
compute the cardinality intersection of two sets (the numerator of the cosine
similarity).
2.2 The intersection step
During the rst step of the protocol, the two peers compute the size of the set
intersection of their two proles S1 and S2 by using a protocol for scalar product
or a protocol for the cardinality set intersection. We assume that the proles
S1 and S2 can be represented as binary vectors of size l
5: 1S1 = fa1; : : : ; alg
and 1S2 = fb1; : : : ; blg such that ai = 1 if the rst peer has item i in his prole
and 0 otherwise (the same goes for bi). For illustration purpose, we call the rst
peer Alice and the second peer Bob.
There are advantage and disadvantages for both set-intersection based and
scalar-product based approaches. To our knowledge, all existing secure set in-
tersection protocols [30, 31, 32, 33] include steps proportional to the input set
sizes, hence revealing the set sizes of the peers to each other. On the other hand,
scalar product protocols [34, 35, 36, 37] inherently require communication com-
plexity proportional to the size of the item domain, which is independent of
the set sizes and thus hiding it, although at the cost of an increased commu-
nication. On the computational size, the scalar product approach has a linear
computation complexity while the set intersection approach has quadratic com-
plexity. Since our primary interest is privacy, we selected the scalar product
approach since it hides the set sizes. First, we will give an overview of dierent
scalar product protocols in the literature in the following section as well as set
intersection protocols.
4The scalar product of two bit vectors a; b of size l is dened as
Pl
i=1 aibi.
5Notice that l is the cardinality of the item domain I. I.e l = jIj.
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Figure 6: Scalar product protocol: The blue peer adds the encrypted bits of the
green peer which correspond to his ones to get the encrypted scalar product.
2.2.1 Scalar product approach
The protocols for scalar product can be divided into two main branches, those
based on secret-sharing [38, Section 4.3], and those based on homomorphic en-
cryption [34, 35, 36]. The secret-sharing ones, although providing no inherent
advantage on the communication complexity, provides an advantage in the com-
plexity's hidden constant because since secret-sharing provides perfect secrecy
and thus does not required big cipher-texts.
Unfortunately, secure multiplication in secret-sharing needs at least 3 peers,
thus requiring a (semi-trusted6) third party [38]. It would be possible, if we
are using gossip-on-behalf for anonymization (cf. Section 1.2.2), to use the
anonymizer as this semi-trusted third party.
The protocol in [36] reveals a permuted sum of the two vectors. This proto-
col is only secure if the other vector is uniformally distributed over the integers,
which is denitely not secure for bit vectors7 (as in our case). So, by excluding
this protocol we are left with [34] and [35]. According to [34], [35] is the exact
same protocol that they weren't aware of at the time of submission. We use
that protocol to implement our scalar-product intersection step in Algorithm 1.
Further in the main protocol, we will just refer to this step as the \ScalarProd-
uct".
Secure scalar product protocol. In a preprocessing step to this protocol,
the two peers engage in the setup phase of a key generation protocol for an
threshold ane homomorphic cryptosystem [21]. At the end of this key gen-
eration phase, both peers have received the same public key pk that can be
used to homomorphically encrypt a value and each one of them has as private
input a secret key, respectively ska for the rst peer and skb for the second
peer. The threshold cryptosystem8 is such that any peer can encrypt a value
using the public key pk but that the decryption of a homomorphically encrypted
value require the active cooperation of the two peers. There is an illustration
in Figure 6.
6Semi-trusted here means being a passive adversary.
7A peer could easily learn the number of zeros and number of ones in some situations.
8The threshold cryptosystem should not be confused with the threshold similarity.
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Algorithm 1 ScalarProduct(1S1 = fa1; : : : ; alg,1S2 = fb1; : : : ; blg)
1: for i = 1 to l do
2: Alice computes Enc (ai)
3: end for
4: Alice sends Enc (a1) ; : : : ;Enc (al) to Bob
5: Bob sets s = Enc (a1) if b1 equals 1, and sets s = Enc (0) otherwise.
6: for i = 2 to l do
7: if bi = 1 then
8: Bob sets s = s Enc (ai)
9: end if
10: end for
11: Bob sends s to Alice
2.2.2 Set intersection approach
Like the scalar-product protocols, the protocols for computing the size of the
set intersection are also divided into those who rely on secret-sharing schemes
[30] and those who use homomorphic encryption [32, 33, 39]. The protocol in
[30], as inherent in secret-sharing, do require the help of a third party in the
two-party case, therefore we focus instead on [32, 33, 39].
The algorithms described in [33, Section 4.4] and [32, Section 5.2] rely on the
same idea. More precisely, they both represent sets as polynomials, where the
roots of the polynomial are the set items (represented as integer). The former is a
two-party version and the latter is a multi-party one. In both however, all items
must be compared to each others, which leads to quadratic complexity. Inan,
Kantarcioglu, Ghinita, and Bertino [39] relaxes this requirement by providing
a dierentially private protocol to block some unneeded comparisons. In the
example they presented, they could save up to 17% of the comparisons needed.
2.3 Threshold cosine similarity
We are interested in a form of similarity which outputs only one bit of informa-
tion stating whether (or not) the similarity between two proles is above some
well-chosen threshold  .
Denition 10 (Threshold similarity). Two peers are said to be  -similar if the
output of applying some similarity measure on their respective sets is above a
chosen threshold 0    1 (i.e. sim(S1; S2) > ).
In practice, the value of the threshold  will be application-dependent and
will be set empirically so as to be signicantly above the average similarity in
the population. Nonetheless, in Section 3.4 we provide heuristic for selecting
the threshold as a function of the desired acceptance ratio.
The threshold similarity protocol takes as input two proles S1 and S2 (one
prole per peer) represented as binary vectors and output one bit of information
which is 1 if S1 and S2 are  -similar (i.e. sim(S1; S2) >  for sim a predened
similarity measure and  the value of the threshold), and 0 otherwise. The
threshold similarity is very appealing with respect to privacy as it guarantees
that the output of the similarity computation will only reveal one bit of infor-
mation, which is potentially much less than disclosing the exact value of the
17
Figure 7: Threshold similarity: The peer accepts only the peers having similarity
with him above a certain threshold. The similarity is based on the common items
in their proles.
similarity measure. In order to do the threshold step, we employ a secure in-
teger comparison protocol. We revise the relevant secure integer comparison
literature in the next section.
2.4 Integer comparison step
The integer comparison problem, known as the socialist millionaires' problem,
where two parties have their own private inputs and want to compare them
without revealing anything about their inputs. A variety of solutions to this
problem have been developed since Yao [40] proposed it.
Nonetheless, all these protocols lay under two broad branches, both of which
depend on bit-wise operations. One of the two branches is based on encrypted
truth tables, while the other exploits homomorphic operations on encrypted
bits.
The encrypted truth table technique requires the input to be known (i.e. in
plain-text) to its owner as opposed to being passed as it is without requiring
decryption after being evaluated from a previous circuit. The homomorphic
operations on encrypted bits takes advantage of the homomorphic properties
of a cryptosystem to achieve the same with less communication overhead than
encrypted truth tables but at the expense of costly asymmetric encryption.
Some methods require both parties to know the value of their inputs to be
able to correctly setup the protocol [41], while others can work directly on the
bit-wise encryption of these inputs [42, 43]. In case where the value as a whole
is encrypted but the bit-wise encryption is not available, bit-decomposition pro-
tocols are used.
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Bit-decomposition. Since all these methods depend on bit-wise operations,
an important ingredient of these protocols is a bit-decomposition scheme. A bit-
decomposition scheme takes a homomorphically-encrypted integer and outputs
the homomorphically-encrypted values of each bit of this integer [44, 45].
Least signicant bit. Nishide and Ohta [43] provides better solution for
integer-comparison protocol by requiring only the least signicant bit to be
computed instead of the entire bit-decomposition. This method worked origi-
nally for secret-sharing schemes but can be adapted to homomorphic encryption
as well.
Lin's method [41] requires at least one peer to know his number in plain-text
while Garay's method [42] is less ecient than Lin's as it requires both homo-
morphic addition and multiplication to operate on the encrypted bits. We reject
the former as both peers will not have their input in plain-text, and we reject
the latter because Nishide's protocol (presented in the following paragraph) is
more ecient than both Lin's protocol and Garay's protocol it as it uses only
the least signicant bit instead of all the bits.
Nishide's protocol. To the best of our knowledge, Nishide's protocol [43] is
potentially the most ecient protocol in terms of communication and commu-
nication. It operates only on the least signicant bit as detailed. This method
was originally presented in the context of secret-sharing, but we translate it to
the setting of homomorphic encryption.
Algorithm 2 CompareIntegers(Enc (a) ;Enc (b)) [43]
1: w  LeastSignicantBit(2Enc (a) mod n)
2: x LeastSignicantBit(2Enc (b) mod n)
3: y  LeastSignicantBit(2(Enc (a)  Enc (b)) mod n)
4: if Dec (wx _ wxy _ wxy) = 1 then
5: Output \a < b"
6: else
7: Output \a  b"
8: end if
Checking the least signicant bit of 2a mod n, is equivalent to checking
whether a < n=2 or not, where n is the RSA modulus of the homomorphic
encryption (or the secret-sharing scheme eld cardinality.)
Nishide and Ohta have showed using a truth-table that with w; x; y you
can uniquely determine each corresponding output for a < b. This method is
ecient because it only uses ane multiplication, and a very shallow binary
circuit on w; x; y, with only 3 least signicant bit protocol invocations (which is
the just rst round of any bit-decomposition protocol). Unfortunately, because
ane homomorphic cryptosystems cannot provide multiplication of encrypted
values, it cannot be used to compute the last binary circuit (in the if statement).
A method like the conditional gate from [46] has to be used.
The conditional gate is an interactive protocol to multiply two bits x; y,
which involves each peer in turn multiplying the same random number si 2
f 1; 1g of his choice to both bits, ending up with Enc (s1s2x) and Enc (s1s2y).
Finally they perform a threshold decryption of the the former, and scalarize the
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Enc (xy), as desired. The conditional gate along with the negation gate9 com-
pose a NAND gate, which is universal for binary circuits, and is used to evaluate
the Boolean logic expression in the protocol.
2.5 Private similarity computation
Instead of computing directly the cosine similarity as denoted in Equation (5),
we avoid the need for performing a square root on encrypted values (an op-
eration which is non-trivial and often costly) by squaring the whole equation.
The squaring operation renders the next cryptographic operations easier while
preserving as the same time the order relation. Formally, the similarity metric
eectively used in ThresholdCosine is 




jS1j  jS2j : (7)
On one hand for obtaining the numerator, we square the output of the intersec-
tion step by applying the multiplication gate from [23] to multiply it by itself. On
the other hand, the denominator can be computed by the rst peer sending his
homomorphically-encrypted set cardinality to the second peer (i.e. Enc(jS1j)),
who will scalarize it by his own set cardinality by doing jS2jEnc(jS1j) to obtain
Enc(jS1j  jS2j).
Recall, that the objective of the ThresholdCosine protocol is only to learn if
the similarity between S1 and S2 is above a certain (publicly known) threshold
 . We assume that the threshold can be represented as a fraction  = 1=2 (for
1 and 2 some positive integers) and therefore our goal is to verify whether or
not the following condition holds
jS1 \ S2j2




2 jS1 \ S2j2 > 1 jS1j  jS2j (9)
The left side and right side of the inequality can be compared by secure pro-
tocols for integer comparison (cf. Section 2.4). We choose to apply specically
the comparison technique from [43] as it neither require knowledge of the in-
put10 nor a full bit decomposition of the input as other protocols. Although this
protocol was developed initially for secret-sharing, it can be implemented with
homomorphic encryption as well. The output of this comparison step is one bit
stating whether or not the (squared) cosine similarity is above the threshold  .
Theorem 2 (Protocol for threshold cosine similarity). The protocol Thresh-
oldCosine is private with respect to a passive adversary (cf. Section 1.2.3) and
returns 1 if two peers are  -similar and 0 otherwise. The protocol has a com-
munication complexity of O(l) bits and a computational cost of O(l).
Proof. All the communication exchanged between Alice and Bob is done using
a homomorphic encryption scheme with semantic security (cf. Denition 4),
9The negation gate of an encrypted bit Enc (x) is simply 1 ( 1 Enc (x)) = Enc (1  x).
10Therefore, the input can be the encrypted output of a preliminary cryptographic protocol.
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1: Alice and Bob generates the keys of the threshold homomorphic
encryption
2: Alice receives ska, Bob receives skb and they both get the public key pk
3: Alice and Bob compute Enc (jS1 \ S2j) = ScalarProduct(1S11S2)








 2 = Enc

2 jS1 \ S2j2

6: Alice computes Enc (jS1j) and sends it to Bob
7: Bob computes Enc (jS1j) (1 jS2j) = Enc (1 jS1j  jS2j)
8: Alice and Bob use the integer comparison protocol of [43] on
Enc

2 jS1 \ S2j2

and Enc (1 jS1j  jS2j)
9: if Enc

2 jS1 \ S2j2

> Enc (1 jS1j  jS2j) then




therefore the encrypted messages exchanged do not leak any information about
their content. Moreover as the encryption scheme is a threshold version, it
means that neither Alice nor Bob alone can decrypt the messages and learn
their content. The multiplication gate [23] as well as the integer comparison
protocol [43] are also semantically secure, which therefore guarantees that the
protocol is secure against a passive adversary.
Regarding the correctness, it can be seen from the execution of the proto-
col that if Alice and Bob are  -similar then this will result in 2 jS1 \ S2j2 >
1 jS1j  jS2j when the integer comparison protocol is executed (and therefore
an output of 1) and in 0 otherwise. The multiplication gate and the integer
comparison protocols are independent of l and can be considered as having con-
stant complexity (both in terms of communication and computation) for the
purpose of analysis. On the other hand, the protocol ScalarProduct requires the
exchange of O(l) bits between Alice and Bob as well as O(l) computations which
result in a similar complexity for the global protocol ThresholdCosine.
3 Dierential privacy and utility analysis
Cryptography gives us the tools to compute a distributed function in such a
way that the computations themselves reveal nothing that cannot be learned
directly from the output of the function. This is a strong privacy guarantee but
at the same time, this does not preclude the possibility that the output itself
might leak information about the private data of individuals. In order to obtain
have the best of both worlds (secure multi-party computation and dierential
privacy), the main idea is to use cryptographic techniques to securely compute
a dierentially private algorithm. In this section, we give ecient and secure
algorithms for computing a dierentially private version of the exact similarity
and the threshold similarity.
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We dene two proles S1 and S2 as being neighbors if they are the same up
to a particular item. Note that for simplicity and without loss of generality, we
consider only neighboring proles that retain the same size. For instance, S1 is
a neighbor of S2 (and vice-versa) if it is identical except for one item that may
have been replaced to obtain the prole S2. If the two proles are represented
as an indicator function (binary vectors of set-membership), they are neighbors
if they are within Hamming11 distance 2 (and they both have the same L1-norm
12).
3.1 Dierentially private threshold similarity
Regarding the threshold similarity, it is important to notice that it is meaning-
less to add some random noise to a binary value (the output of the threshold
similarity), because it amounts to ipping the variable with some probability.
In this case, the most direct way to achieve dierential privacy is instead to add
the noise before the application of the threshold function instead. The following
theorem shows that this does not hurt the privacy guarantee obtained.
Theorem 3 (Impact of threshold on privacy). Applying the Laplacian mecha-
nism before the application of the threshold function does not hurt the dierential
privacy.
Proof. As Lemma 2 states, a mechanism A(z) is -dierentially private if it
outputs a probabilistic post-processing function (g) of an -dierentially private












The following lemmas state the sensitivity of scalar product (equivalent to the
sensitivity of cardinality set intersection) and the squared cosine similarity.
Lemma 3 (Sensitivity of the scalar product). The sensitivity of the function
ScalarProduct is 1.
Proof. Consider three dierent proles 1S1 , 1S2 and 1S3 , represented as binary
vectors of size l bits, such that 1S2 and 1S3 are neighbors. Replacing an object
from S2 by another object to obtain S3 will only increase (or decrease) the value
of the scalar product between h1S1 ;1S2i and h1S1 ;1S3i by 1 at most, therefore
the sensitivity of the scalar product is 1.
11Hamming distance of two binary vectors is the number of positions in which they dier.
12L1-norm of a vector V is kV k1 =
P
i jVij, which for binary vectors is equivalent to the
number of ones of this vector.
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It follows from the previous lemma that the sensitivity for the cosine sim-
ilarity, assuming the denominator stays the same, is = 1jS1jjS2j . However, for
the squared cosine similarity the situation is dierent.
Lemma 4 (Sensitivity of the squared scalar product). The sensitivity of the
function jS1 \ S2j2 = h1S1 ;1S2i2 (where h; i is the scalar product) is at most
2min(jS1j ; jS2j)  1.





























 2 h1S1 ;1S2i   1
= max
S1;S2
2 jS1 \ S2j   1
 2min(jS1j ; jS2j)  1 :
And by the same denominator argument, the sensitivity of the squared cosine
similarity is PSjS1j;jS2j (ExactSquaredCosine) =
2min(jS1j;jS2j) 1
jS1jjS2j
3.3 Dierentially private similarity computation
According to Theorem 1, to provide dierential privacy it is sucient to add
Laplacian noise proportional to the sensitivity of the function to the true answer
before releasing it. This can be done interactively in a centralized environment
where a curator is holding the data and replying to queries. For the distributed
setting, we discuss three possible alternatives in the following sections. The rst
one depends on the availability of semi-trusted third party, while the last two
are fully distributed and do not require a third party.












stances used in the protocol description are called n1; n2; : : :.
3.3.1 Using a semi-trusted third party
In the context of gossip-on-behalf (see Section 1.2.2), the peer that acts as an
anonymizer in the bidirectionally anonymous channel could also generate the
required random noise. Note that the peer is semi -trusted in the sense that
he is trusted that he will not collude with any peer to break the anonymity,
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but in the same time he is not trusted enough to reveal the private proles
for him in the clear. For instance, the anonymizer can adds the random noise
using the homomorphic property of the cryptosystem (as he knows the public
key) to the similarity value that has been computed. Afterwards, the two peers
that have been involved in the similarity computation can recover the result
using the threshold decryption, either after applying the threshold (for thresh-
old similarity) or before it (for exact similarity). Algorithm 4 describes this
procedure.
Algorithm 4 DierentialSquaredCosine(S1,S2,)
1: Alice and Bob generates the keys of the threshold homomorphic
encryption
2: Alice receives ska, Bob receives skb and they both get the public key pk










as well as the sizes of their proles jS1j and jS2j






adds Laplacian noise n1 where n1  N using the homomorphic property
6: The anonymizer sends the perturbed squared cosine similarity (which is
homomorphically encrypted) to Alice and Bob
7: Alice and Bob cooperate to decrypt the homomorphically encrypted value
and get as output ExactSquaredCosine(S1; S2) + n1
Theorem 4 (Protocol for dierential squared cosine). Algorithm 4 is secure
with respect to a passive adversary and -dierentially private. The protocol has
communication complexity of O(l) bits and a computational cost of O(l).
Proof. It follows from Theorem 2 that the rst part of the protocol before
the anonymizer adds the noise, is secure with respect to a passive adversary.
The anonymizer has only the knowledge of the public key and thus cannot
decrypt the messages it sees. Moreover, the messages are semantically se-
cure and therefore leak no information to the anonymizer. At the end of
the protocol, assuming that the anonymizer does not collude either with Al-







, which ensures the -dierential property of
the protocol according to Theorem 1. For the complexity, because of the use of
the protocol ScalarProduct as a subroutine, the protocol DierentialSquaredCo-
sine has a communication cost of O(l) bits as well as a computational cost of
O(l) (we consider here that the threshold decryption has constant complexity
and is negligible with respect to the cost of the scalar product).
3.3.2 Distributed noise generation
There are several possible ways to achieve -dierential privacy in the context of
the exact similarity depending on whether or not we have access to another peer
which is assumed not to collude with any of the two peers that computes their
similarity and can act as a semi-trusted party. A possible way to achieve this
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would be for the two peers to add themselves the noise directly when executing
the protocol for similarity computation.
For the distributed noise generation, where each of the two peers adds his
own independent noise, we give thereafter an analysis of the global amount of
noise that has to be added by each peer to obtain the total amount of noise
required. Notice that the noise is usually a real number and that homomorphic
encryption only supports integers. For now we assume that the homomorphic
encryption can support real numbers and address how to achieve this in Sec-
tion 3.3.3.
Two exponentials. According to Lemma 5 the dierence between two ex-
ponentially distributed random variables is a Laplacian distribution. Therefore
if both peers generate randomly their own exponentially distributed random
variable and one peer (say Alice for instance) adds her noise while the other
(Bob) subtracts his noise from the result, then the obtained result is a Laplace-
distributed variable. For instance, if the desired noise has the form of N 
Lap (0;GS (f) =), then each peer generates i.i.d Y  Exponential (=GS (f)).
(Note that as we assume a passive adversary, each peer generate and add his
share \honestly").
Denition 11 (Characteristic function of a continuous random variable). Let
fX(x) be the probability density function (PDF) of the continuous random vari-
ables X, which is the probability that X = x, then the characteristic function
of X is 'X(t) =
R1
 1 e
itxfX(x)dx, where t 2 ( 1;1) is the parameter of the
characteristic function.
Lemma 5. If E1; E2  Exponential () are i.i.d random variables, and L =
E1   E2, then L  Lap (0; 1=).
Proof. The characteristic function13 of E1 is

 it+ and for  E2 is it+ . As
the two variables are independent, adding them amounts to multiplying their
characteristic function, which simplies to 
2
t2+2 and corresponds exactly to the
characteristic function of L.
Notice that if the exact similarity is reveals, a malicious peer can remove his
noise to end up with a minimum or maximum for the real similarity. Thus this
method is only recommended for the threshold similarity.
Two Laplacian distributions. Suppose that Alice and Bob want to release
the result the scalar product between their two proles. At the end of the proto-





using the homomorphic property of the encryption
scheme. Afterwards, they could cooperate to perform the threshold decryption
and they would both get to learn the perturbed scalar product. Then Alice can
subtract her own noise from the released output to recover a version of the scalar
product which have been perturbed only with Bob's noise (which she cannot
remove). Unlike the two exponentials method which is not recommended for
exact similarity protocol, this one is recommended (so that peers can remove
13The PDF of the exponential distribution parametrized by  is e x : The PDF of the
Laplace distribution is shown in Equation (3)
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their extra noise). We provide in Algorithm 5 a protocol for scalar product that
satises -dierentially privacy using the two Laplacian technique.
Algorithm 5 DierentialScalarProduct(S1,S2,)
1: Alice and Bob generates the keys of the threshold homomorphic
encryption
2: Alice receives ska, Bob receives skb and they both get the public key pk





4: Alice generates Laplacian noise nA parametrized by
1
 and computes
Enc (jS1 \ S2j) nA = Enc (jS1 \ S2j+ nA) and sends the result to Bob
5: Bob generates Laplacian noise nB parametrized by
1
 and computes
Enc (jS1 \ S2j+ nA) nB = Enc (jS1 \ S2j+ nA + nB)
6: Alice and Bob cooperate to decrypt the homomorphically encrypted value
and get as output (jS1 \ S2j+ nA + nB)
Lemma 6 (Two Laplacian). DierentialScalarProduct (Algorithm 5) satises
-dierential privacy.
Proof. From the composition lemma (Lemma 2) and an argument similar to
the one used in Theorem 3, the algorithm DierentialScalarProduct is at least






















So whether a peer removes his noise or not afterwards, the protocol remains
-dierentially private.
Theorem 5 (Protocol for dierential scalar product). The protocol Dieren-
tialScalarProduct (Algorithm 5) is secure with respect to a passive adversary and
-dierentially private. The protocol has a communication complexity of O(l)
bits and a computational cost of O(l).
Proof. From Lemma 6 and argument similar to one used in Theorem 4, the proof
follows for the security against a passive adversary, the -dierential privacy,
and the complexity. Security against a passive adversary holds because all the
messages exchanges during the protocol are semantically secure. Dierential
privacy holds from Lemma 6. For the complexity, because of the use of the
protocol ScalarProduct as a subroutine, the protocol DierentialScalarProduct
has a communication cost of O(l) bits as well as a computational cost of O(l)
(we consider here that the threshold decryption has constant complexity and is
negligible with respect to the cost of the scalar product).
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3.3.3 Dealing with real noise as integers
One potential challenge is that noise is usually a real number while homomorphic
encryption only supports integers (or rationals [47]). In this section, we provide
to solve this problem for the semi-trusted third party approach, and for the two
exponentials one. Note that the two Laplacian approach is similar to the two
exponentials approach.
Third party noise. We assume that the third party can divide two numbers
then add the noise with homomorphic encryption. Suppose that these two
numbers are called x; y and that the noise to be added is called n = n1=n2 (i.e.





, is equivalent to xn2+yn1yn2 . The numerator and denominator apart can
be simplied by scalarization and addition operations of integers, which can
be done using the homomorphic encryption. We can then compute the group
inverse of the denominator using the inversion gate from [48]. Afterwards, we
multiply the numerator with the inverse of the denominator to deal with the
division. In the decryption phase, the rational number can be recovered using
the lattice-based technique [47]. The lattice-based technique uses a lattice with
initial bases (N; 0); (xy 1 mod N; 1), then uses bases reduction algorithms to
nd the shortest vector in this lattice, whose components turn out to be the
numerator and denominator.
Two exponentials noise. For the two exponentials case, we do not release
the similarity but rather the threshold, therefore we do not need the lattice-







. The threshold  = 12 and the computed similarity value is















This can be simplied to the following all-integer equation
Enc (y)  2eA1 eB2   2eA2 eB1  Enc (x)  2eA2 eB2   Enc (y)  1eA2 eB2  :
As we can see, only homomorphic addition and scalaring are needed.
3.4 Utility analysis
As dierential privacy via the Laplacian mechanism implies the addition of
noise, then it will also cause some error to the decision made by the threshold
function, rendering some accept decisions to be rejects (false negatives) or vise
versa (false positives). More precisely, a false negative arises when the protocol
outputs that two peers are not ()-similar while they are so in fact, the opposite
goes for false positives. In the case of Gossple, false negatives might reduce the
number of the search results returned, while false positives might increase the
number of unrelated results and thus hurt personalization and relevance of the
results returned.
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We chose to measure the utility in terms of the probability of not having
false negatives because we arguably decided that a low number of results is more
severe than low relevance of results. Should we change our mind and choose to
measure false positives instead, a similar analysis for false positives is straight-
forward. In Section 3.4.5 we provide the equations for utility in terms of not
having false positives, and in terms of not having false decision at all (be them
positives or negatives).
3.4.1 Statistical model
We describe here the statistical model that we use for performing our analysis.
This model can also be used as a guide to choose the threshold value () to
apply in practice as well as the privacy parameter () (cf. Section 3.4.3), as well
as measuring the achievable trade-o between utility and privacy.
In our model:
 The parameter l is the total number of items in the domain of items.
 l1 = jS1j and l2 = jS2j are the sizes of the proles of the two peers (Alice
and Bob).
 The random variable S represents the number of items in common be-
tween two peers (i.e the size of the set intersection jS1 \ S2j). S has a
Hypergeometric distribution [49] as we show in Lemma 7.
 N is a Laplace random variable representing the noise to be added. With
parametrized sensitivity we get adaptive noise :
N  Lap (0;PSl1;l2 (ExactSquaredCosine) =) ;
and with the global sensitivity we get non-adaptive noise :
N  Lap (0;GS (ExactSquaredCosine) =) :
 FX(x) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random vari-
ables X, which is the probability that X < x.
 fX(x) is the probability density function (PDF) of the random variables
X, which is the probability that X = x.
Denition 12 (Hypergeometric distribution [49]). A Hypergeometric distribu-
tion can be modeled as a box that contains N balls of which there are m white
balls. Afterwards, n balls are drawn at random from that box without replace-
ment. We count a success when a white ball is drawn. A Hypergeometric random
variable is the numbers of successes in such a run. Straight forwardly, we also
have that the maximum number of success is m.
Lemma 7. Assuming that all items in the domain are equally likely to be picked
and that none are more frequent than others, then the the random variable S rep-
resenting the number of items in common between two peers is Hypergeometric(n =
max(l1; l2);m = min(l1; l2); N = l), where l is the total number of items in the
domain (which is the length of the indicator function).
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Proof. Without loss of generality assume that S1 is the smaller set of the two
sets. Let the other peer (owner of set S2), pick n = l2 items from the domain (of
size N = l) without replacement to ll l2 item in his set S2. A pick is successful
if the item picked is also contained within the set S1. Therefore, the number
of possible successes is at most m = l1. A successful pick ends up in the set
intersection of S1 and S2. The number of success (from the Hypergeometric
distribution; Denition 12) is the size of the set intersection S as desired.
3.4.2 The utility function
Remember that we measure utility as the percentage of similarity measures that
does not count as a false negative after the noise has been added and that the
similarity value is S2=(l1l2).
Theorem 6. The utility function is:
U (l1; l2; l; ; ) = 1 
min(l1;l2)X
s=bpl1l2c+1
fS(s)FN (   s2l1l2 )
1  FS
 bpl1l2c : (11)
Proof. The probability that a peer gets accepted is P (S2=(l1l2) > ), where
 is the public threshold value while the probability of getting rejected after
adding the Laplacian noise is P (S2=(l1l2) + N  ) = P (N     S2=(l1l2)).
Let  =
p
l1l2 and  =    s2l1l2 . This results in the following utility function:
1  P (rejected after adding the noisejaccepted before adding the noise) =
1  P (N  j S
2
l1l2
> ) = 1  P (N  jS > )
= 1  P (N   ^ S > )










 1 fN (n)fS(s) dn











1  FS () :
Note that the lower limit of the sum is bc+1 whereas the upper limit min(l1; l2).
The utility function can be used by peers to set the security parameter 
dynamically depending on the size of the sets of the two peers so as to guarantees
a lower bound on the utility.
The conditional probability
P (rejected after adding the noisejaccepted before adding the noise)
is equal to the probability that an item will get rejected after adding the noise,
given that it would have been accepted had not we add such noise, which is
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Figure 8: Setting the trade-o between privacy and utility (Non-adaptive noise,
l1 = 10; l2 = 10; l = 10
6;  = 0:8)
the denition of a \false negative". We notice that by subtracting it from 1,
we are getting the opposite probability, which is the probability of not having
a false negative. Notice that this also counts the probability of having a true
positive or a false positive (since the entire probability domain (1) is composed
of those four cases), and hence is not equivalent to the probability of having
\true negatives".
In the above proof, rst we expand the conditional probability P (N  jS > )
to P (N^S>)P (S>) by the denition of conditional probability. Then we expand the
numerator to a summation (and integration) over the probabilities (fN;S) of all
the cases that count (i.e. N   and S > ). Afterwards, since N and S
are independent, then fN;S = fN  fS . We nd that fS is independent of the
integration variable n, so we get it out of the integration. We notice that the
integration now simply resembles the CDF of N , FN .
In Equation 11 (which is a function of l1; l2; ; ; and l), assuming that l1; l2
are xed, when plotted with dierent possible values of l1 and l2 shows the eect
of the privacy parameter  for a given threshold  and domain cardinality l (see
Figure 8).
3.4.3 Selecting the threshold
Lets assume that a peer is expected on average to be similar to r = 20% of the
peers he meets. Call this the acceptance rate. Then, the  parameter can be
chosen by substituting the desired acceptance rate (without taking into account
the error caused by the addition of noise) into the inverse cumulative density
function (inverse CDF, or CDF 1) of the Hypergeometric distribution (HG).
This function takes 1  r; l1 and l2 (assuming that l is xed a priori) and gives
the expected intersection size which will occure with probability near r. We say
\near" because the intersection size is discrete and thus might not always match
the exact desired probability. Let S  Hypergeometric(n = max(l1; l2);m =
min(l1; l2); N = l), then
1  r = P ( S
2
l1l2
 ) = CDFS(
p







where r is the desired acceptance rate. See Figure 9 for illustration of several
scenarios.
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200; l2 = 100; l = 1000)








103; l2 = 105; l = 106)
Figure 9: Inverse cumulative distribution function of the Hypergeometric dis-
tribution for choosing parameters
3.4.4 The impact of adaptive noise on utility
As shown by Figure 8, using the non-adaptive noise of the global sensitivity, the
utility does not seem very good for small input sizes as we get a false negative
rate around 50%. In particular in Figure 10, we show the utility value obtained
with adaptive and non-adaptive noise for dierent values of  .
 eect on utility. The parameter  aects the utility because the size of
the set intersection cannot be bigger than the size of the smaller set. This
results that the similarity (for the square cosine) is always less than or equal
to min(l1; l2)=max(l1; l2). Thus if  is chosen above this value the false negative
rate is exactly 0, because all decisions would have been also negative in the rst
place14.
3.4.5 Alternative utility measures
In this section we provide alternative utility measures than the probability of
not having false negatives. Choosing which measure to use depend on the ap-
plication.
Utility as the probability of not having false positives. By a construc-
tion similar to that of Theorem 11, we nd that the probability of not having
false positives would be










fS(s)(1  FN (   s2l1l2 ))
FS
 bpl1l2c :
And since N is a Laplacian random variable which is symmetric about 0, then
1  FN (n) = FN ( n), hence the utility function is









We show a plot for the this utility function in Figure 11.
14However, this is not the case with the false positive rate.
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(a) Utility with non-adaptive noise









(b) Utility with adaptive noise
Figure 10: Adaptive vs. Non-adaptive noise (utility based on not having false
negatives). The x-axis is the privacy parameter , and the dierent curves
correspond to dierent values of the threshold  . Both gures plot the same
range of values for  .
Utility as the probability of not having false decisions. Let r;R be the
events of being rejected before and after adding noise, respectively. Let a;A be
the events of being accepted before and after adding noise, respectively.
Since the events R ^ a;R ^ r;A ^ a;A ^ r are independent and mutually
exclusive, then
P (R ^ a) + P (R ^ r) + P (A ^ a) + P (A ^ r) = 1 :
So the probability of not having false decisions is


































1 s  bpl1l2c
 1 s > bpl1l2c
:
We show a plot for the this utility function in Figure 12.
4 Conclusion and future work
The Web 2.0 has recently witnessed a proliferation of user generated content
including a large proportion of personal data. Preserving privacy is a major issue
to be able to leverage this information to provide personalized services. Fully
decentralized systems somehow protect users privacy to be exposed to large
companies, avoiding the \Big brother is watching you" syndrome. However, in
some sense this is an illusion as they might expose personal data to other users in
the network. In this internship, we have addressed this challenge in the context
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(a) Utility with non-adaptive noise









(b) Utility with adaptive noise
Figure 11: Utility based on the probability of not having false positives. The x-
axis is the privacy parameter , and the dierent curves correspond to dierent
values of the threshold  . Both gures plot the same range of values for  .







(a) Utility with non-adaptive noise








(b) Utility with adaptive noise
Figure 12: Utility based on the probability of not having false decisions at all.
The x-axis is the privacy parameter , and the dierent curves correspond to
dierent values of the threshold  . Both gures plot the same range of values
for  .
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of Gossple project by providing users with a way to compute their similarity
with respect to other users while preserving the privacy of their proles.
More precisely, we have introduced a two-party threshold similarity protocol
enabling a user to quantify his similarity with another user, without revealing
his prole and without requiring a trusted third party. We proved that the
proposed protocol is secure in the presence of a passive adversary and we have
gone beyond that by providing dierentially private protocols for the exact
and threshold similarity. This provides a strong privacy guarantee which holds
independently of the auxiliary knowledge that the adversary may have. We have
also studied the impact of the noise generation on the utility of the resulting
similarity.
To summarize, our work highlights the fact that cryptography and dierential
privacy are two dierent but complementary notions. On one hand, dierential
privacy gives strong privacy guarantees with respect to how much information
can be learned about the inputs of the participants from the (perturbed) output
of a function. Thus, dierential privacy help us to reason on which type of
information can be safely released with respect to privacy. On the other hand,
cryptography, and more specically secure multiparty computation, gives us
the tools to compute a distributed function in a secure and robust way and
remove the need for a trusted third party, which is of paramount importance in
a decentralized setting. When possible, it seems therefore natural to combine
dierential privacy and cryptography into an integrated approach as we have
done for private similarity computation in distributed systems.
The contributions of this report include a bound on the noise added to
enhance the utility and including dierent variants of a distributed noise gener-
ation protocol. We have also identied the need for a bidirectionally anonymous
channel to insure -dierential privacy in a distributed setting.
Future work may include:
1. Addressing malicious participants (modeled by an active adversary) that
can cheat during the execution of the protocol in order to learn the input
of honest participants, perturb the output of the protocol or simply make
it crash. We are especially interested in developing dierentially private
similarity protocols which stay robust and secure even on the presence of
an active adversary. We are also interested in developing a bidirectionally
anonymous channel provably secure against active adversaries by studying
Crowds [13], Tor [14], AP3 [12], and MIXnets [11].
2. The application of this approach to a fully decentralized clustering algo-
rithm and the evaluation of the achievable trade-o between utility (as
measured by the quality of the global clustering) and privacy. As well
as evaluating and improving the eciency of the protocols in terms of
communication and computation overhead.
3. Study the same problem for a group-similarity metric [2] that measures
the overall similarity of a group of peers.
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